We present some three-valued paraconsistent logics, in particular SP3A logic which has been recently introduced as a genuine paraconsistent logic. After discussing the relevance of some rules in classical logic, we motivate the need for paraconsistency. Then we mention areas of applications of non-monotonic reasoning in terms of programming semantics, and mention the relationship that exists between these semantics and logics. In particular we show that logic SP3A belongs to the family of D-elemental logics; these logics can characterize one of the semantics useful in the area of non-monotonic reasoning.
Introduction
Consistency is a property that comes from complying that x ∧ ¬x is always false. This means that when a formal system can never produce two or more formulations that contradict each other, then we say that such system is consistent. Classical logic is consistent and holds many other desirable properties: de Morgan laws, distributivity, among others and is the right choice whenever a solid and consistent theoretical foundation is needed. Therefore, mathematics, physics, chemistry and engineering take a hold on the basis of classical logic since these disciplines work with instances that generally do not allow contradictions.
This view of the necessity of consistence was strongly defended by Aristotle, and is called the law on non contradiction (LNC) (presocratic philosophers did not consider consistency as a matter of necessity) [11] . Logical systems that comply with consistency are called classical or aristotelian; in aristotelian systems, if we accept a formula that does not comply with the LNC, explosivity occurs: the logical system explodes into an infinity of propositions that can be proved as true. This can be expressed as x ∧ ¬x → y However, the LNC has not been formally proved yet, and even Aristotle failed trying to show the necessity of its compliance [11] . On the other hand, not only presocratics believed that consistency in a classical way is not necesary for a formal system to be valid: as we will see later, logics that do not obey LNC have been developing since the beginning of XXth century. Non classical logics arise then as valid logics even when they do not hold the LNC, and arise too as an answer to situations where contradiction is an inherent feature.
In next section (section 2) we briefly review formal systems and their structure. Section 3, is about paraconsistent logics; in particular we present SP3A and SP3B logics. Section 4 is a brief review of logic programming, where we review some transformations of logic programs in order to avoid inner contradictions. Finally, in the last section we present D-elemental logics and a demonstration that SP3A logic is D-elemental.
On Formal Systems, Semantics and Axiomatics
As da Costa remarks in [5] , it is difficult to give a precise definition to semantics, specially when working with non-classical logics. However, up until now, and given that our pourpose is not a deep philosophical study of semantics, we will understand it as da Costa mentions: "When first proposed in the fields of logic and formal sciences, the term «semantics» send to present a clear sense. It was supposed to denote that part of an analysis of a language concerned with the determination of the meanings of its (well formed) expressions" [5] . In this sense, we will then consider that a logic can be defined and analysed when its connectives are defined by presenting their behavior through a truth-table, and well formed formulas (wfs) are presented and evaluated by this same way. This means that semantics allows us to determine if a statement is a tautology, a contradiction, or which is its particular evaluation for any specific interpretation of its variables; moreover, it helps us to determine wether two statements are equivalent to one another. Going back to da Costas's definition of semantics, it must be noted that it implies the determination of the meaning of a wfs. Then, as the semantic approach leads us to elaborate truth-tables that evaluate wfs to defined truth values, at the end we will have a bunch of truth values as the meaning of that specific wfs. Then, it is necessary to understand the meaning of all the truth values in the domain of that particular logic. In classical logic they are (0 = F alse and 1 = T rue), but when it comes to many-valued logics, the matter is not so obvious. Later we will discus about this particular issue.
Mendelson on the other hand, illustrates the axiomatic method by defining a formal theory (a formal system). As Mendelson claims, a formal theory needs 4 conditions to be satisfied: 1. A set of countable symbols to form expressions. An expression is a finite sequence of these symbols. 2. A set of countable expressions that will be called well-formed formulas, and a method to determine if an expression is a wfs. 3. A set of wfs called axioms. 4. A finite set of rules of relation between wfs (rules of inference) [8] .
Using these rules of inference over axioms, new valid wfs can be obtained. If an obtained expression is a tautology, then it is called a theorem.
By this method, we can generate new theorems, and prove things such as logical equivalence or dependence among expressions.
Semantic and axiomatic approaches must not be considered as opposite but as complementary; it is natural to use both in order to perform proofs and calculations.
Paraconsistent Logics
In this section we will review some background of paraconsistent logics: What is paraconsistency, forerunners of paraconsistet logic and finally, we will present two paraconsistent logics proposed by Jean-Yves Béziau.
Non-classical Logics: 3-valued and Paraconsistent Logics
As stated in [3] , a logic is a set of wfs that satisfies two properties: Classical logic is the most well known logic, and holds many well defined characteristics; it is 2-valued, obeys LNC, and double negation (the negation of the negation of a formula is equivalent to the original formula ¬¬x → x); in general, classification of logics is not a precise matter, and it is difficult to claim that a logic is classified in a particular way. However, for us, non-classicism means at least one of two characteristics:
-The logic has 3 or more values.
-The logic does not obey the LNC.
In this sense, our object of interest (SP3A logic) holds both of them, so it will be called a non-classical logic.
Paraconsistency:
There is a group of non-classical logics that are called paraconsistent logics. da Costa is one of the main initiators of paraconsistent logics, and his original definition was "a one-place operator ν is paraconsistent if there is a formula a such that the theory a, ηa is non-trivial", that is, a and ηa are both true simultaneously, with the constraint that this operator should obey all the properties of classical negation (though it is not clear which properties are these) [5] .
According to Béziau , "Paraconsistent logic can be considered a bunch of logical systems in which there is a connective which does not obey the principle of noncontradiction; such a connective is usually called a paraconsistent negation and the main problem is to know if it is legitimate to call such an operator a negation" [2] . These paraconsistent logics make it possible to deal with contradictions without our formal system exploding into triviality. This property is useful when working with contradictory information (as in non-monotonic reasoning) and makes paraconsistent logics a powerful tool when we need to deal with contradictions; in this work we will focus in just one field of application: Artificial Intelligence.
3-valued logics and the interpretetion of the third value
Among non-classical logics, there is a group of logics that are called multivalued; these multivalued logics hold a dominion D with more than two truth values. Logically, there are three-valued logics in which D = {0, 1, 2}, and where 0 and 2 usually behave classically just as classical 0 and 1 do; but in these logics, the value 1 must be interpreted in a particular way. There are several interpretations for this value, and the interpretation must match with the logic semantics and this interpretation makes the particular logic useful for specific areas of study. In [6] , Coste-Marquis considers multi-valued logics as useful when working with contradictory pieces of information (when working with agents for example); more specifically 3-valued logics, and where the third value (1) is given a specific interpretation: "Proved both True and False". However, this approach does not guarantee that its inferences are consistent. Later we will introduce SP3A and SP3B logics. These logics need an interpretation for their third values. We will propose an interpretation for SP3A. Although in [6] a particular interpretation for the third value in 3-valued logics is "both true and false", there can be many different ways to understand it. In [4] , Ciucci and Dubois mention some of them: possible, unknown, undefined, half-true, irrelevant, inconsistent. These interpretations can be classified in two types: ontological (undefined, half-true, irrelevant) and epistemic (possible, unknown). Ontological values make reference to a situation where the nature of the third value is not questioned, but understood as an intrinsic feature of the expression; epistemic values on the other hand, are values whose state will eventually change into 0 or 2 in the future.
Forerunners of Paraconsistency: Łukasiewicz 3-valued Logic, Vasili'év Logic and G 3 Logic
History of paraconsistent logics is long yet almost unknown for most people; Priest states that presocratic philosophers where familiar with logical systems that did not obey the LNC, and it was Christianism that took Aristotelian theories, and the LNC as a dogma for centuries [11] . As a result, classical logic was the only one that developed along this period. In 1910 Jan Łukasiewicz published the book On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle. This book studies Aristotle's LNC, and concludes that it can not be proved in the sense that every contradiction is false: even if Aristotle's arguments were proved, it would prove only that some contradictions are not true.
Łukasiewicz gives then what he claims is the only strict and formal proof for the LNC: the only way to prove it is to assume that contradictory objects are not objects at all, it means they are nothing, instead of something; this means that anything that is something and not nothing, does not contain contradictory properties [12] . Łukasiewicz was one of the forerunners on non-classical logics; as he studied the LNC and found out there was no way to prove it valid for every contradiction, he set the precedent for paraconsistent logics, and defined the family of logics Ł ω . Vasili'év is also considered a precursor of paraconsistency. Inspired by Lobatchevsky's non-Euclidian geometry, he had some ideas about what he called imaginary logic [5] . Łukasiewicz and Vasili'év ignited the development of paraconsistency.
Finally, we will mention a logic defined by Göedel. This logic belongs to the family of multivalued logics G i , and is the 3-valued logic G 3 . The relevance that this logic has for our work is that SP3A logic has no implication connective defined in it and given that we will need it later, we will use G 3 native implication for it.
Béziau's Paraconsistent Logics SP3A and SP3B
In this work, we present the analysis of some features of SP3A logic. This is a 3-valued paraconsistent logic proposed by Jean-Yves Béziau in Two Genuine 3-Valued Paraconsistent Logics [1] , where Béziau presents SP3A and SP3B . Each of these 3-valued logics have only three primitive connectives: negation, conjunction and disjunction. In tables 1 and 2, we respectively present the definition of SP3A and SP3B connectives: Table 1 . Truth tables of connectives ∧, ∨, and ¬ in SP 3A.
∧ 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 0 2 2 ∨ 0 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
x ¬x 0 2 1 2 2 0 Table 2 . Truth tables of connectives ∧, ∨, and ¬ in SP 3B. According to the definition of paraconsistent logic given by Béziau , SP3A would be a paraconsistent logic since its negation does not obey the LNC. This can be seen in Table 3   Table 3 . Law of Non Contradiction in SP 3A and SP 3B.
x ¬x x ∧ ¬x ¬(x ∧ ¬x) 0 2 0 2 1 2 2 0 2 0 0 2
x ¬x x ∧ ¬x ¬x ∧ ¬x 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 2
As can be seen, ¬(x ∧ ¬x) is not a tautology in neither of these logics. That is why Béziau claims these are paraconsistent logics.
Béziau presents his logics and analyses some of their behaviors, mainly in properties related to negation, such as de Morgan laws and double negation; Béziau shows too that substitution theorem does not hold in neither of these logics.
Logic Programming
In "Paraconsistent Logic in a Historical Perspective" [5] , the authors state that the future of Paraconsistent Logic lays in some research lines such as: It is in particular the last item in the list above the matter of interest for this work: when working with Logic Programs, Belief Databases, interaction with human beings, sensor fusion, it is common that inconsistencies appear, collapsing the system. There are techniques to avoid it, and using paraconsistent logics to treat the information is one of them. In this section we explore some background of logic programming and belief revision.
Logic programs
Logic programs are formed by 1 or more logic formulas; these programs are designed to make controlled logic inferences in order to demonstrate theorems automatically [3] .
According to Schlipf, a literal is an atomic formula R(t 1 , t 2 ...t n ) (a positive literal) or a negated atomic formula ¬R(t 1 , t 2 ...t n ) (a negative literal).
A logic program is a finite, or countably infinite, set of rules, (implicitly universally quantified) formulas of the form a ← b 1 ∧ b 2 ∧ ... ∧ b n , where a is a positive literal and the b i s' are all literals -positive or negative- [13] .
Note that in [13] , the head of a rule contains just a single literal; however we will use a more general approach where rules are expressions in the form A ← B where A = a 1 ∨ a 2 ∨ ... ∨ a k and B = b 1 ∧ b 2 ∧ ... ∧ b n ∧ ¬b n+1 ∧ ... ∧ ¬b n+m , with k ≥ 1 and where a i s and b i s are atomic formulas [3] .
According to Carballido, we can say:
A logic program (LP) is a theory, this is, a set of formulas; a class of Logic Programs is a set of LP that satisfies certain property or syntactical limitation. [3] .
Definition 2. Rules used in Logic Programming hold the following structure: A ← B, where A is called head of the rule and B is called body of the rule. [3] .
Note that A ← B is usually used as an alternate form to B → A (← is a kind of implication [13] ). In order to abbreviate notation, it is common to write a rule in the form:
Types of programs and rules
Any
.. ∧ ¬b n+m , with n ≥ 0 and m ≥ 0 is called a clause or disjunctive rule. In case that n = 1 we will call it a Normal Clause. If the clause has no negated atoms, then will call it Positive. A program which all of its rules are disjunctive is called a Disjunctive LP, and a program which all of its rules are normal is called a Normal LP. The size of a disjunctive clause is defined by k + n + m [3] . If there is a program in the form A ←, then it is called a fact; an expression in the form ← B is called a restriction.
Stable Model Semantics
In order to explain what the Stable Model Semantics is, we will give two definitions: 
Example
Let P be the LP shown:
The classical models for P are: {a}, {c, b}, {a, b}, {a, b, c}. Minimal classical models are: {a}, {c, b}.
In [9] , Osorio defines Stable Model Semantics as shown in the following definition:
Definition 5. Given a disjunctive program P , for any set M of atoms in P , P M is the program obtained from P by removing:
1. Each clause that contains at least one negative literal ¬b in its body, whith b ∈ M . 2. All the negative literals in the bodies of remaining clauses.
Taking the program from the previous example, and considering M 1 = {a} and according to the definition of stable, we get P M1 as: Analyzing P M2 , its minimal model is {b} = M 2 . Neither M 1 nor M 2 are stable models of P .
In [10] , the author shows that the stable semantics can be characterized by modeling in intermadiate logics. We present next another semantics that can also be applied in non-monotonic reasoning, and can be characterized in terms of paraconsistent logics, in particular D-elemental logics. This semantics is called p-stable semantics and offers an alternative to the stable semantics [3] .
P-stable Model Semantics
Next, we define another transformation that is helpful to define an alternative semantics to the stable model semantics.
Definition 7. Let P be a program and M a set of atoms in P . Then, we define RED(P, M ) :
Definition 8. Let P be a normal program and M a set of atoms in P , then, if RED(P, M ) C M , we say that M is a p-stable model of P . Where the symbol C means that the formulas on the right can be proved from those on the left in classical logic.
Example
Continuing with the example, , if we take M 1 = {a}, then we get RED(P, M 1 ):
By following the next equivalences: ¬a → b ≡ ¬b → ¬¬a ≡ ¬b → a so we have (b → a) ∧ (¬b → a). From this formula it follows a, and then, M 1 is a p-stable model of P .
Treating Inconsistency in Artificial Intelligence
When a system interacts with the world, there is a flux of information to take in account; the world changes constantly and new information is generated every instant. Our system has then the necessity to constantly update the information in its data bases. But it is common that new and previous information are opposed to one another. Even more, it may occur that given a set of sensors, some of them give contradictory information at the same instant in time (in sensor fusion for example). If the system interacts with people, the possibility of inconsistent information is even higher: humans are naturally so complex and behave in contradictory ways: a person changes his mind from one moment to another, judges situations in a subjective way and frequently acts in a different way than he thinks or for every enviroment acts in a special manner. If such a system is based on classical logic, these contradictions lead to inconsistencies that could make the system explode so that (x∧¬x) → y, and preventing contradictions becomes a matter of major importance. But if we have a way to deal with contradictions withouth our system exploding, then the problematic situation loses strenghth.
When working with contradictory information there are several approaches that allow us to avoid the trivialization. This is a fundamental problem in A.I.; The problem can be treated by belief revision, belief merging, reasoning from preferred subsets, purification, paraconsistency, etc. The existence of such a wide spectrum of approaches can be explained by the fact that paraconsistency can be achieved in various ways; the particular situation stablishes the needs to be fulfilled and the way to follow in order to achieve this paraconsistency [6] .
Paraconsistency taken in a strict sense allows us to deal with inconcistency directly, while the other approaches require some extra-logical information to avoid trivialization; the limitation in these cases is in the fact that this extra information may be too poor or too sophisticated [6] .
Belief Revision
Human beings are always changing our minds: new information gets to us and modifies our considerations and knowledge about the world: changes our beliefs. When working with agents in Artificial Intelligence leads us to a similar scenery: an agent is defined by Russel and Norvind as "any entity capable of perceiving and acting on the world" (cited in [7] ). When an agent interacts with an environment, fresh information is arriving all the time making it necessary to it to change its «beliefs» (Belief is a relation between an agent and a proposition; however it is difficult to restrict which relations are beliefs and which are not [7] ). Belief Revision is the discipline that studies the rationality of belief change in agents [7] .
Moretto mentions as an example a few agents working in a determined environment.
SP3A logic is D-elemental
This last section is dedicated to prove that SP3A logic is D-elemental; definition 9 tells us what does it mean that a logic is D-elemental: Definition 9. A multi-valued logic E is D-Elemental if its domain D contains three special elements 0, 1 and t, that satisfy the following properties [3]:
1. t is a designated value, and 0 is undesignated 2. The value assigned to 1 → 0 s not designated 3. Connectives ∧ and ∨ are commutative and associative 4. For every value of x, 0 ∧ x = 0 and 0 → x ∈ {1, t} 5. For every special element x, 1 ∨ x ∈ {1, t} 6. For every special element x, t ∨ x ∈ {1, t} 7. Fragment {0, t} matches classical logic (for ∧, ∨, → and ¬) 8. Fragment {0, t} is closed respect to ∧ and → connectives 9. The value assigned to negation of 1 is an element in {1, t} 10. E logic lies between C ω and C, where C is classical logic. That is C ω ⊂ E ⊂ C In the following lines we will prove that SP3A logic is D − elemental
The logic SP3A does not include any implication as a primitive connective; however, it is necessary to have an implication in SP3A in order to prove it is a D − elemental logic. In order to have an implication for SP3A , now, we are going to define G 3 implication in SP3A terms. G 3 implication is defined as shown in 10 Definition 10. G 3 implication is defined by:
x → y = 1 : x ≤ y y : x > y Within SP3A , G 3 implication will be denoted by the symbol "→ G ", and it is expressed in terms of the SP3A connectivesby:
The Possitive logic The Possitive logic (P os) is defined by a set of 8 axiomatic schemes; these schemes are listed below:
For every wf s α, β and γ [3] :
It can be easily proved that SP3A obeys all these axiom schemes using a semantical approach.
The C ω logic C ω logic was proposed by daCosta ; it is defined by the axiom set of P os, plus C ω 1 and C ω 2.
Let α be a well formed formula in C ω , then
C ω is a minimal paraconsistent logic which means that any other logic E, in which ¬(A ∧ ¬A) is not a theorem must contain every C ω theorem [3] . Then, as a consequence of this affirmation we can state the next lemma: Lemma 1. SP3A logic contains all the theorems in C ω logic: C ω ⊆ SP 3A Proof: As shown in table 3, ¬(A ∧ ¬A) is not a theorem in SP3A. Then, SP3A must contain every C ω theorem.
Now we proceed to verify that SP3A logic obeys the 10 points that define a Delemental logic:
1. Dominion of variables in SP3A is D = {0, 1, 2}; in this sense, SP3A logic satisfies this point: 0 and 1 are in its domain, and there is a designated value t = 2 while 0 is undesignated 2. In SP3A , 1 → G 0 = 0; 0 is not designated 3. In SP3A , connectives ∧ and ∨ are commutative and associative; it can be proved easily using truth tables 4. For any x in the domain of SP3A , 0 ∧ x = 0; 0 → G x ∈ {1, 2}. This occurs because x ∈ {0, 1, 2} and in every case 0 ≤ x and according to the definition of the G 3 implication, in these cases the evaluation is 1 5. In SP3A , ∨(x, y) = max(x, y). Then, 1 ∨ x ∈ {1, 2} since x ∈ {0, 1, 2} 6. As in SP3A ∨(x, y) = max(x, y), then t ∨ x = 2 ∨ x = 2, and 2 ∈ {0, 1, 2} 7. In SP3A , fragment {0, t} = {0, 2} behaves classically as can be seen in table 4 8. let x ∈ {1, 2}, then 1 ∧ x ∈ {1, 2} and 2 ∧ x = 2. It occurs too that 1 → G x = 2 and 2 → G x ∈ {1, 2}. Then we can say that in SP3A the fragment {1, 2} is closed for connectives ∧ and → G 9. ¬1 = 2, 2 ∈ {1, 2} 10. As stated in lemma 1, C ω ⊆ SP 3A; all theorems in SP3A can be proved in C.
That is: C ω ⊆ SP 3A ⊆ C Theorem 1. SP3A is a D-elemental logic.
Proof: as shown previously.
Paraconsistent logics and logic programming
Finally, we will mention a theorem as stated and proved in [3] : ∧ 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 ∨ 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2
x ¬x 0 2 2 0 →G 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2
